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Reserve System. China and other poor, yet rapidly growing, nations now account for over a third of global
trade and they have a virtual monopoly in speciﬁc sectors such as toys and textiles. What is
the eﬀect of trade with these low-income countries (LICs) on inﬂation, productivity, and industry
structure in developed economies?
The standard approach taken in the literature to identify the causal eﬀect of trade relies on
natural experiments, such as one-time tariﬀ reductions. While event studies such as Treﬂer (2004)
have greatly enhanced our understanding of trade’s one-time impact, the narrow event window
of these experiments limits their ability to capture cumulative eﬀects of a phenomenon such as
"globalization." Moreover, the regime change experiment, due to the paucity of natural events, is
not a viable strategy to examine the block impact of trade with the newly developing world.1
The contribution of this paper is to develop an instrumentation strategy that measures the
true eﬀect of the gradual increase in trade with the nine major LICs on U.S. industry productivity
and prices. Our approach relies on the most basic force of trade, comparative advantage. The
classical theory of trade predicts that countries should specialize in industries that intensively use
relatively abundant factors. We document that this relationship also holds at the margin: if a
country’s output capacity grows, exports increase most in sectors that are intensive in factors the
country is abundant in.
We ﬁrst show that labor intensity can explain changes in trade ﬂows between the United
States and individual LICs, while it fails to explain marginal trade ﬂows between the United
States and other developed economies. In contrast, skill intensity can explain marginal trade
ﬂows between developed economies, but has no power in explaining bilateral LIC-U.S. trade. From
these counterfactuals, we conclude that changes in trade ﬂows are well explained by diﬀerences in
factor endowments. We next construct a measure of the comparative advantage-induced imports
from LICs.
Second, we develop an empirical framework that abstracts from sector-speciﬁc trends and
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Due to this diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, the identifying restriction
1We are not aware of one-time events that induced a sizeable increase in LIC imports. For example, China’s
accession to the WTO in 2001 reduced average tariﬀs by less than two percentage points. Although the accession
of Mexico to NAFTA had a sizeable eﬀect on Mexico (see Hanson 2003), it did not aﬀect the United States to an
extent measurable in nationwide data.
2necessary to establish the causal eﬀect of trade only requires that U.S. relative demand shocks
are not systematically biased toward labor-intensive goods. The latter assumption is reasonable
ex ante and can also be tested by investigating whether imports from developed nations are
systematically biased towards labor-intensive goods, which is not the case.
We ﬁnd that LIC trade has had a profound impact on U.S. relative producer prices and
productivity.2 The two-stage least squares estimates reveal a profound negative relationship
between changes in LIC import share and changes in U.S. producer prices. We ﬁnd that when
our nine LICs capture 1% market share in a sector, U.S. producer prices decrease between 2%
and 3%. This result stands in stark contrast to the OLS regressions predicting an insigniﬁcant
and often positive correlation between these two variables.
We next decompose the price-dampening eﬀect into the contribution of productivity growth,
markup reductions, and cost changes. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that the dominant channel in which
LICs have aﬀected U.S. industry is by inducing sectoral productivity growth, as predicted by
Melitz (2003) and in particular by Bernard et al. (2007). The latter authors predict that trade-
induced productivity growth is especially large if trade is motivated by comparative advantage, in
addition to the Ricardian motive. In our estimations, a one percentage point increase in the U.S.
market share of LIC imports is associated with a productivity increase of about two percentage
points. We also ﬁnd that decreasing markups can explain the remainder of the three percentage-
point drop in prices, but this result is not statistically signiﬁcant.
Further corroborating the evidence in favor of the "new" new theories of trade, we also docu-
ment that the response of prices and productivity to import competition is systematically related
to the elasticity of demand. While the response of import ﬂo w st og r o w t hi nL I C si sm u c hm o r e
pronounced in sectors with elastic demand, the response of prices and productivity to a given
increase of import competition is systematically higher in sectors with inelastic demand. We also
ﬁnd the diﬀerences between sectors with diﬀerent elasticities of demand are larger in the long run
than in the short run.
Surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a negative eﬀect of LICs on the wages of unskilled
2We do not analyze the direct eﬀect of changes in LIC imports on U.S. import prices because import prices are
not available on a bilateral basis and aggregate import price data are available only for a small number of sectors.
3workers. While OLS regressions do suggest that increasing exposure to low-wage countries does
depress the wages of production workers, this is never the case in any of the IV speciﬁcations of
this study.
Second, we also estimate the importance of intermediate goods, relying on the measure of input
intensity developed by Schott (2004). When we split the sample into sectors that do contain and
those that do not contain inputs, we ﬁnd the following. While the ﬁrst-stage estimation for sectors
that do not contain any inputs is well identiﬁed, we cannot predict marginal trade ﬂows in sectors
containing input goods. That is, our instrumentation strategy does not predict the intermediate
good content of trade and therefore, it does not capture the "cost channel" eﬀect of inputs from
China and similar countries, but rather the pro-competitive eﬀect of low-wage country imports.
The conclusion of this paper is that globalization has had a profound impact on U.S. relative
prices and productivity, much larger than is commonly assumed. Our results, however, should be
interpreted with care when making statements about the aggregate eﬀect of LICs on U.S. inﬂation,
productivity, and wages. We estimate the eﬀect on relative prices, and due to the diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerence type of identiﬁcation, our methodology abstracts from factors such as the increase in
global raw material prices that growth in LICs has brought about.
Given these limitations, a rough estimate is that from 1997 to 2006, the U.S. PPI inﬂation
rate in the manufacturing sector was reduced due to the trade with LICs by about two percentage
points (each year), while productivity growth was increased by one to two percentage points in
the sectors examined in this paper. China accounts for over one half of the total eﬀect.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the relationship of our approach to the
existing literature. Section 2 describes our data. Section 3 documents that imports from LICs
can be explained by comparative advantage. Section 4 lays down the empirical framework and
discusses the identifying assumption. Section 5 presents empirical results of the LIC impact for
the following U.S. sectoral variables: producer prices, productivity, markups, and wages. Section
6 decomposes the eﬀect on prices into changes in productivity, markups, and costs. Section 7
analyses the impact of demand elasticity and compares long- and short-term responses. Section
8 concludes.
41 Relationship to the Literature
The developing economies examined in this study are China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Malaysia,
Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. As documented in Figure 1, these nine countries
accounted for imports worth more than 5.5% of U.S. GDP in 2006, or roughly one-third of total
U.S. imports. Even more impressive is the growth rate of trade with this group of countries: in
1997, they accounted for imports worth a mere 2.5% of U.S. GDP.
Notwithstanding the large magnitude of trade volume, many empirical studies ﬁnd that im-
ports from LICs only had a small aggregate eﬀect on the U.S. industry structure, price levels, and
inﬂation.3 Studies based on micro data that are closest to our investigation are Bernard et al.
(2006), Broda and Weinstein (2007), Broda and Romalis (2008), Feyzioglu and Willard (2008),
Glatzer et al. (2006), Kamin et al. (2006), the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (2006), and
Wheeler (2008). Other studies focusing on inﬂation - including Ball (2006), Borio and Filardo,
(2007), Ihrig et al. (2007), Pain et al. (2006), Razin (2004), and Tootell (1998) - use conventional
speciﬁcations of the Phillips curve to determine the role of foreign output gaps or import prices
on domestic inﬂation.
We argue that the existing literature fails to establish the true eﬀect of trade since trade
ﬂows are endogenous to local demand conditions. For example, when a sector in the United
States experiences a positive demand shock, prices increase, thereby inducing an increase of
imports from LICs. The negative inﬂuence of LIC imports on prices is compounded with the
positive eﬀect that U.S. demand has on LIC import ﬂows. Similarly, the estimated eﬀect of LIC
imports on U.S. productivity is biased toward zero in an OLS regression. This bias arises because
positive sectoral productivity shocks in the United States tend to increase domestic production
and therefore reduce imports.
Our instrumentation approach is motivated by the Heckscher-Ohlin theory, which predicts that
countries specialize in industries that intensively use relatively abundant factors. The Rybczynski
theorem extends this prediction in a dynamic context. The modern extensions of the Heckscher-
3Numerous central bank governors and policy makers have recognized that the links between globalization and
inﬂation go beyond inﬂuencing relative price diﬀerences in the short term. Mishkin (2007), Carney (2008), Trichet
(2008), Rogoﬀ (2006), and others highlight the role of productivity, markups, and price ﬂexibility.
5O h l i nt h e o r yb yT r e ﬂer (1993; 1995), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Romalis (2004), Bernard et al.
(2007), and Chor (2007) account for factor-augmenting technology, transportation costs, and the
Ricardian motive for trade. Dynamically, these theories predict that when the economy grows,
exports increase relatively more in sectors with comparative advantage. In what follows below,
we thus instrument for marginal trade ﬂows with ﬂows induced by comparative advantage.
Bernard et al. (2006), who proxy industry exposure to low-wage countries by the sectoral
import share originating from countries with less than 5% of U.S. GDP per capita, provide a
study that is most similar in spirit to our instrumentation strategy, While we think that their
measure of import share originating from LICs is well suited to establish the eﬀect of trade on
within-industry productivity dynamics (i.e., diﬀerences across single plants in a given industry),
we do not think that their instrument can capture industry-wide eﬀects since aggregate trade
ﬂows are endogenous to U.S. supply and demand shocks. In this study, we therefore instrument
for trade ﬂows themselves rather than using the level of LIC imports as a causal driver of U.S.
industry.
An alternative methodology developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) constructs measures of
geographic proximity to foreign markets to establish the causal eﬀect of trade on income. Due to
the fact that geographic proximity does neither vary across sectors nor across time, it cannot be
used to establish the eﬀect of increasing and industry-varying exposure to LICs that this study is
concerned with.
An alternative methodology developed by Frankel and Romer (1999) constructs measures of
geographic proximity to foreign markets to establish the causal eﬀect of trade on income. Due to
the fact that geographic proximity does neither vary across sectors nor across time, it cannot be
used to establish the eﬀect of increasing and industry-varying exposure to LICs that this study is
concerned with.
2D a t a D e s c r i p t i o n
We use annual trade data from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC),
covering the 1997-2006 period. The classiﬁcation of the import data is six-digit North American
6Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) and the selected trade type is the General Customs
value.4 U.S. data on wages, producer prices, and productivity (four to six-digits) are from the
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).5 Information to construct sectoral markups were taken from
the Annual Survey of Manufactures, see the Appendix for the respective deﬁnition of variables.
The overlap of industry information from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the price data
from the BLS yields 325 diﬀerent sectors (NAICS codes 311111 to 339999).
Sectoral information used to construct sectoral markups was taken from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers; see the Appendix for the respective deﬁnition of variables. The overlap of industry
information from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the price data from the BLS yields
325 diﬀerent sectors (NAICS codes 311111 to 339999).
The measure of import penetration is constructed in the following way. We divide the value
of imports from the country in question (or from the nine LICs together) by the value of U.S.
domestic shipments plus world imports. To make sure that our results are not driven by the
endogenous response of U.S. sales to U.S. demand, the value of domestic shipments plus world
i m p o r t si sa v e r a g e do v e rt h e10 years in our sample.6 Our measure of import penetration takes
the value of 0.01 in a sector where imports from the country in question amount to 1% of average
U.S. sales in the respective sector.
We evaluate absolute changes in import penetration; i.e., import penetration at time t minus
import penetration at t − 1. This strategy is expedient since the response of U.S. prices should
be related to the increase of imports normalized by U.S. demand rather than related to the
percentage increase of imports. Further, evaluating absolute growth rather than the relative
(percentage) growth of imports does not force us to drop any zero-trade observations.
To measure an industry’s labor intensity, we use information from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers. Labor share is deﬁned as the 1997 to 2006 average of the U.S. labor expenditure
share for each of the 325 sectors. The labor expenditure share equals expenditures for labor
4The General Customs value is appraised by the U.S. Customs Service and is the price paid or payable for
merchandise when sold for exportation, excluding U.S. import duties, freight, insurance, and other changes incurred.
5The BLS publishes only four-digit data on its website. Additional data were obtained through private corre-
spondence.
6Due to this averaging, LIC import share could exceed 100% towards the end of the sampling period. This is
never the case in any of the 325 industries.
7divided by the total expenditure for labor and capital. Because we exclude expenditures for
inputs, energy, and transportation, the average labor share is rather high at 85%.O n l y t a k i n g
into account labor and capital expenditures, however, leads to a clear measure of labor versus
capital intensity and we thus follow this deﬁnition.
The sample criterion for the nine LICs in this study is the following. We deﬁne a nation to be
"low income" if it’s non-PPP adjusted GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 20% of U.S. income
per capita. There are 133 LICs for which we have both trade and GDP (per capita) information
(source: World Bank Development Indicators), but most of these countries account for only a very
small fraction of U.S. imports. Furthermore, most countries do not publish reliable information
about their manufacturing output. We thus drop all countries that account for less than 0.4% of
U.S. imports in 2005.T h e r ea r e17 remaining economies that have less than 20% of U.S. GDP
per capita and account for more than 0.4% of U.S. world imports. We next exclude all countries
where raw materials account for more than 30% of U.S. imports. We next exclude all countries
where raw materials account for more than 30% of U.S. imports.7 The latter criterion excludes
Angola, Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, and Venezuela.
In total, we end up with nine countries that account for 87% of U.S. non-raw material imports
from LICs. They are China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand,
and Vietnam. In 2005, these nine countries accounted for 37% of non-raw material U.S. imports
and for 32% of all U.S. imports.
How would altering the criterion aﬀect our sample? Changing the cut-oﬀ of a "low income"
country to 10% of U.S. GDP per capita excludes Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia. Altering the level
at which a country is dropped from our data set because it exports mostly raw materials has no
big eﬀect on the composition of our sample. We would include Chile if the cut oﬀ is higher than
35%, and the next country to be included is Colombia if the cut oﬀ is above 59%.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
Mexico has the highest raw material import share of the included countries at 16%.L a s t , i f
we also include countries with less than 0.4% of total U.S. imports, this adds a large number
of countries, yet only very little trade volume. For example, lowering the cut-oﬀ to 0.3% would
7Raw material imports are deﬁned as the sum of imports in sectors (Harmonized System) 27 (mineral fuels),
7106, 7108, 7110, 74, 7502, 7601, 7801, 7901, and 8001 (diﬀerent unwrought metals)
8add only Turkey, and lowering it to 0.2% would also add the Dominican Republic, Argentina,
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Pakistan. These additional countries, in total, account for only 1.5%
of U.S. imports and 3.8% of non-raw material imports from LICs.
3 LIC Trade and Factor Intensity
Labor-abundant nations tend to export labor-intensive goods. The upper scatter plot of Figure
2 relates the volume of U.S. imports from the nine LICs normalized by U.S. sales in 1997 to the
sector’s labor intensity. In 1997, imports were concentrated in labor-intensive industries. The
lower scatter plot of Figure 2 documents that this relationship is even more pronounced in 2006.
In terms of changes, the two scatter plots of Figure 2 also imply that the increase in LIC imports
was concentrated in labor-intensive sectors.8 Table 1 formalizes this observation.
In all estimations of Table 1, the dependent variable is the year-to-year change of the U.S.
import share from selected country. For example, in Column (1), the dependent variable is the
absolute change of imports from China divided by the size of the respective sector in the United
States. The U.S. sector size is deﬁned as the value of domestic shipments plus the values of
imports from all countries.
In the random eﬀects model of Column (1), the independent variables are the growth of
industrial output in China, the sectoral labor expenditure share, and the interaction of the two
(gchinalsj).
Column (1) documents that when industrial output in China grows, exports to the United
States increase more in labor-intensive sectors compared to imports in capital-intensive sectors.
The coeﬃcient of gliclsj is estimated at +0.665 and is highly signiﬁcant, that is, when China’s
industrial capacity grows, exports to the United States increase when the sector is more labor-
intensive. In contrast, the main eﬀect of industrial growth is estimated to be negative at −0.445.
This means that if the annual growth of Chinese industrial output is 1%, the value of U.S. imports
in an industry using only capital (lsj =0 ) decreases by 0.445 percentage points.
8It is often argued that China and other emerging economies grow by accumulating capital rather than labor.
Figure 3 documents that this is not the case: the real stock of capital and the stock of labor adjusted for labor
productivity grew at the same rates during the period with available data (1996 to 2004).
9For the same 1% change in Chinese output, U.S. imports in an industry using only labor
(lsj =1 )i n c r e a s eb y(0.665−0.445)∗0.01 or 0.22 percentage points. The average labor intensity
i nt h es a m p l ei s0.85, so that the average sector will capture an import share of 0.12 percentage
points when China’s aggregate manufacturing output grows by 1%.
In Column (2), we next add ﬁxed eﬀects to the estimation in order to ﬁlter out sectoral trends.
Because the labor share is averaged over time and does not vary within a sector, it is dropped
from the estimation. Next, in Column (3), we also add time dummies to the estimation. Because
the growth of industrial production in China is an aggregate variable, this regressor is dropped
from the estimation when time dummies are introduced.
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the speciﬁcation of Column (3) for imports from Mexico, India,
and Vietnam. In these speciﬁcations and in the rest of the paper, we include time dummies and
ﬁxed eﬀects so that the labor share and the aggregate growth rate of these countries are dropped
from the estimations. The coeﬃcients for growth interacted with labor intensity are positive and
signiﬁcant. The coeﬃcients are smaller reﬂecting the fact that these economies are smaller than
the Chinese economy.
We next turn to two falsiﬁcation exercises that are particularly important in the context of
the identiﬁcation restriction made in the next section. The fact that imports grew particularly
quickly in labor-intensive sectors may also be a result of U.S. demand shocks biased towards
labor-intensive goods. As a ﬁrst falsiﬁcation exercise, we next repeat the analysis for Canada and
Japan in Columns (7) and (8). We ﬁnd that labor share multiplied by manufacturing growth in
the two countries is not signiﬁcantly correlated with changes in import share.
As a further counterfactual, we instrument for Japanese trade with Japanese growth interacted
with skill intensity. The measure of skill intensity is constructed by averaging the U.S. share of
non-production workers of total employees averaged over 1997 to 2006. While this measure can
predict changes of imports from Japan (see Column (9)), it fails to predict imports from China
(see Column (10)).
Summarizing, Table 1 documents that there is a systematic relationship between the changes
in U.S. imports, growth, and comparative advantage. When labor-abundant LICs grow, their
exports increase much more in labor-intensive sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. When a
10skill abundant nation such as Japan grows, its exports increase in skill-intensive sectors, yet not
in labor-intensive ones.
We next construct our instrument, the weighted growth rate of the nine LICs in our study
interacted with skill intensity. The instrument is constructed in the following way. We ﬁrst
generate one weight for each LIC country i by averaging (imports from country i /(U.S. domestic
shipments + total imports)) over the 325 sectors and over the 10 years. We then construct the
weighted growth of manufacturing output in the nine LICs by summing over the growth rate
multiplied by the country weight. Finally, we multiply the weighted growth rate by the 1997 to
2006 average U.S. labor expenditure share of sector j. Since the labor share varies over industries
and the growth rate over time, the instrument varies across both time and sectors.
4 Empirical Framework
It is evident that trade is endogenous to global and local demand conditions. In this section, we
lay out our strategy to instrument for trade ﬂows with those induced by the growth of aggregate
productive capacity in LICs interacted with labor intensity. The exhibition in this section is
conducted for prices, but the analysis applies equally to productivity.
W eb e g i nw i t ht h et r u er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt rade and prices. Denote U.S. prices at time t
for sector j by pus,j,t, and sectoral U.S. imports from LICs normalized by the U.S. sector size by
mlic,j,t. Denote the industry-speciﬁc trend of U.S. prices in sector j by αp,j,t h ec o m m o ns h o c k
to U.S. prices at time t by  p,t,a n ds e c t o r - s p e c i ﬁcp r i c es h o c k sb y p,j,t. Finally, let ∆ denote the
change of a variable.
In the United States, the true relationship between price changes and the changes of import
volume is given by
∆pus,j,t = αp,j + β∆mlic,j,t +  p,t +  p,j,t. (1)
In Equation (1), the coeﬃcient of interest is β, measuring the true impact of an increase in imports
from LICs on sectoral prices. A prior shared by most researchers is that LIC imports lower U.S.
prices, i.e., β<0.
Imports, however, also respond to U.S. demand conditions. Apart from the unobserved export
11supply shocks in LICs (denoted by ∆sm,j,t), U.S. prices also inﬂuence how much foreign ﬁrms
export. The relationship between the change in LIC imports, U.S. prices, and export supply
shocks in LICs, ∆sm,j,t,i sg i v e nb y
∆mlic,j,t = αm,j + δ∆pus,j,t + θ∆slic,j,t +  m,t +  m,j,t, (2)
where αm,j is an industry-speciﬁc trend of LIC imports,  m,t is a common shock to exports to the
United States, and  m,j,t is a sector-speciﬁcs h o c k .
When prices in the United States rise, imports from LICs most likely increase. Therefore, an
OLS estimation of β in Equation (1) is biased. When δ>0 and β<0, the true eﬀect of LIC
imports is either underestimated or even estimated with the wrong sign. We thus instead focus
on ﬁnding an exogenous driver of export supply shocks in LICs, ∆sm,j,t.
We next turn to the instrumentation strategy. Denoting the growth of LICs by glic and a
sector’s time-invariant labor intensity by. lsj, export supply shocks in LICs are determined by
∆slic,j,t = αs,j + λ1glic,t + λ2glic,tlsj +  s,t +  s,j,t, (3)
where  s,t and  s,j,t are aggregate and sector-speciﬁcs h o c k s .
Since aggregate growth in LICs may be correlated with aggregate demand in the United
States, we do not use Equation (3) as an instrument for trade. Rather, we evaluate the diﬀerence
of imports between two sectors j and k that diﬀer in their time labor intensities lsj and lsk,
yielding




glic,t (lsj − lsi)+ ∗
m,j,k,t. (4)
The reduced-form relationship between labor intensity diﬀerentials and price diﬀerentials is de-
rived by substituting Equation (4) into a similar diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence version of Equation (2).
The reduced-from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation relating LIC growth changes and skill in-
12tensity to relative changes in prices is























((αp,j − αp,i)+β (αm,j − αm,k)+βθ(αs,j − αs,i)).
By construction, the residuals of any regression are orthogonal to the dependent variables. Since
we estimate the change in (i.e., the ﬁrst-stage regression of Equation (4)), it is always true that
 ∗
m,j,k,t is orthogonal to glic,t. Our methodology can therefore establish the true eﬀect of LIC
imports if the following condition holds.
Assumption 1. (Identiﬁcation Restriction)
( p,j,t −  p,k,t) ⊥ glic,t. (6)
It is important to note that the orthogonality assumption (6) does not impose that aggregate
growth in LICs is orthogonal to U.S. demand shocks (that are cancelled out due to the diﬀerence-
in-diﬀerence formulation).
Rather, our orthogonality assumption (6) is an assumption about relative price shocks and
therefore relative demand shocks in the United States. We assume that growth in LICs was not
the result of sector-speciﬁc demand shocks that are concentrated in labor-intensive sectors.
We believe that this orthogonality assumption is reasonable. In addition, we have already
tested the orthogonality assumption (6) in the previous section, where we demonstrated that
marginal trade ﬂows from Japan and Canada cannot be explained by labor intensity (but by skill
intensity). Hence, it cannot be the case that demand in the United States was systematically
biased towards labor-intensive goods.9
9Technically, our identiﬁcation fails only if all of the following three conditions hold. First, there is a systematic
shift in U.S. or global demand towards labor-intensive goods (for constant prices of these goods). Second, the
demand shift induces imports from LICs. Third, aggregate growth in LICs is caused by the increase in U.S. import
13Given the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence speciﬁcation with year dummies to ﬁlter out aggregate eﬀects
and ﬁxed eﬀects to ﬁlter out sector-speciﬁc trends, the variation that we utilize below is the
following. In years that LICs grow more than average, imports grow more in labor-intensive
sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. This diﬀerent reaction of imports to growth is utilized
to establish the eﬀect of LIC trade.
5R e s u l t s i n a D i ﬀerence-in-Diﬀerence Setup
This section presents OLS and two-step least square estimates for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence form
of Equation (4) relating price changes to changes in import shares. We ﬁrst explain our strategy
a n dd o c u m e n tt h el a r g ed i ﬀerence between OLS and IV estimates in Table 2. We next present
the robustness analysis in Table 3.
As has been argued by Iranzo and Ma (2006), Hanson and Robertson (2008), and others,
China may crowd out imports from other low-wage countries such as Mexico. In order to analyze
the overall eﬀect of LIC exposure on the United States, rather than the eﬀect of China’s imports
on U.S. prices compounded by the crowding-out channel, we analyze the block impact of the nine
countries together.
OLS and IV Estimates: U.S. Producer Prices
In all regressions of Table 2, the dependent variable in Panel B is the percentage change of the
U.S. producer price index for each six-digit sector. We begin our discussion by ﬁrst presenting
OLS estimates of U.S. producer prices regressed on LIC import share. This is done in order
to relate our ﬁndings to the existing literature and highlight the bias in OLS estimations. All
estimations of Table 2 include ﬁxed eﬀects.
Column (1) simply regresses the annual change in LIC import share on the change of the
logarithm of the U.S. producer price. The coeﬃcient is estimated to be signiﬁcantly positive,
that is, these speciﬁcations suggest that imports from low-wage countries tend to increase U.S.
prices. Aggregate U.S. and LIC shocks may be more endogenous than shocks at the sectoral level.
We therefore introduce the growth of low-income manufacturing output in Column (2). The
demand.
14coeﬃcient remains positive, but is no longer signiﬁcant. Since variables other than low-income
manufacturing may aﬀect U.S. prices, we next introduce year dummies in Column (3).
Column (3) establishes that even conditional on all aggregate information — which is ﬁltered
out by the year dummies — OLS estimations predict that LICs seem to have no eﬀect on U.S. prices.
While the estimated coeﬃcient is estimated negative, it is far from signiﬁcant, and economically
very small: the estimation in Column (3) predicts that even if China and other LICs were to
capture 100% of a U.S. market, prices would decrease by only 0.9%.
In contrast, the estimated eﬀect of LIC imports is very large once we instrument for the trade
ﬂows with the comparative advantage induced component of trade. In Column (4), we do not
introduce year dummies, but we again introduce the weighted LIC growth rate of manufacturing
output. Consider the ﬁrst-stage estimation in Panel A, Column (4). The main coeﬃcient of the
growth of manufacturing output in LICs is estimated at −0.675, while the interaction coeﬃcient of
manufacturing growth rate times labor share is estimated at 1.07. If LICs grow by one percentage
point, the import share increases by 0.395% for a sector using only labor, while the import share
of a sector using only capital decreases by 0.675%.
Consider next the second-stage estimation in Panel B, Column (4). If LICs grow, the import
share increases in labor-intensive sectors. This comparative advantage induced component of
trade leads to a large downward pressure on prices: the coeﬃcient is estimated at −3.112%,
that is, a 1% increase in importer market share reduces U.S. producer prices by more than three
percentage points.
We next estimate the main speciﬁcation including ﬁxed eﬀects and year dummies in Column
(5). Again, because the manufacturing output growth is one aggregate number per year, it drops
out once we introduce time dummies. In the speciﬁcation of Column (5), all sector speciﬁc
averages and aggregate shocks are ﬁltered out. Again, we ﬁnd that when imports from LICs
increase by 1% of the U.S. sector size, prices decrease by around 3%.
Before turning to an explanation of why prices react so dramatically to foreign competition,
we ﬁrst present some robustness tests in Table 3.
Robustness Analysis
Table 3 presents several robustness tests. The structure of Table 3 is the following. Panel A
15presents the ﬁrst-stage estimation with changes of the LIC import share as the dependent variable.
Panel B presents the second-stage estimation relating instrumented trade ﬂows to changes in
prices. Panel C presents the OLS equivalent to Panel B.
We start by including the lagged level of LIC imports in the estimation. This speciﬁcation
controls for the fact that the level of LIC imports might aﬀect prices, since existing imports could
become cheaper over time. This is not the case (see Panel B, Column 1). Nevertheless, a high
level of existing exports can further explain increases in imports (Panel A, Column 1).
Prices might react to changes in imports with a lag, and prices might themselves mean revert.
We therefore include the lagged change in the import share in Column (2) and the lagged price
change in Column (3). Indeed, each of these two controls reduces the estimated coeﬃcient for
the changes of imports somewhat, but the coeﬃcient is still estimated above two and highly
signiﬁcant. In Column (4), we control for productivity growth.
Our sample is characterized by a small number of observations with very large price movements
that might not be representative, since they are in raw material-intensive industries such as oil
reﬁneries, copper wire, and petrochemical manufacturing where LIC imports do not have an
important impact on prices. We have thus excluded 35 NAICS-Year observations based on the
criterion that the absolute change in the logarithm of the price exceeded 0.25. The excluded
observations are listed in Appendix B. In Column (5), we include the 35 outliers to the estimation.
The estimated coeﬃcient nearly doubles and is again highly signiﬁcant.
The Hecksher-Ohlin theory of trade and its modern extensions not only make predictions
about trade ﬂows, but also about net trade ﬂows (i.e., imports minus exports). We therefore
instrument for the change in net imports in Column (6). We ﬁnd that net trade ﬂows are well
explained by our instrumentation strategy and also that comparative advantage-induced net trade
has a profound eﬀect on U.S. producer prices.
In Column (7), we analyze the special role of China. In Panel A, we instrument for the change
of Chinese imports with the growth of manufacturing production in China interacted with U.S.
labor intensity. The highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient in Panel B suggests that Chinese exports have a
slightly stronger eﬀect on U.S. prices than imports from other LICs (compare Column 5 of Table
2a n dC o l u m n7o fT a b l e3 ) .
16Summarizing, Table 3 documents that our instrumentation strategy can predict changes in LIC
imports for a wide variety of speciﬁcations and it also documents that the estimated eﬀect of LIC
trade on prices is statistically signiﬁcant and economically large. In Panel C, we also document
that the OLS bias is sizeable for all speciﬁcations. We next analyze the precise channels through
which trade has aﬀected prices.
6 Decomposing the Impact of Import Competition
A good’s cost can be expressed as the product of per unit cost of all inputs used in the production
of the good divided by the productivity with which these inputs are used. A good’s price can be
expressed as the per unit cost of the good multiplied by (one plus the markup). Hence, abstracting
from aggregation issues, the percentage change of the sectoral average price can be decomposed
into the contribution of cost of input changes (∆cj,t), changes in productivity (∆aj,t), and changes
in one plus the markup (∆(1 + πj,t))( a l w a y si n% ) .
∆pj,t = ∆cj,t − ∆aj,t + ∆(1 + πj,t)
With this de-composition in mind, in this section, we set out to analyze why prices react so
strongly to import competition.
U.S. Productivity
Table 4 repeats the basic speciﬁcation of Column (5) in Table 2 and the robustness tests of
Table 3, but with productivity as the dependent variable. Because the ﬁrst stage is identical
to that of Table 2, it is not reported. Panel A of Table 4 presents the two-stage least squares
estimates, while Panel B presents the OLS results.
In Column (1), we present the baseline estimation including only ﬁxed eﬀects and year dum-
mies, and the interaction of LIC growth and labor intensity. A one percentage point increase in
i m p o r t si sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha2.375% increase in sectoral productivity. Hence, of the 3.1% total
percent price change, over three-fourths are explained by productivity growth.
In the robustness tests presented in Table 4, the magnitude of productivity changes is compa-
rable to the baseline result of Column 1. It is economically large, but signiﬁcant only in ﬁve of the
17eight speciﬁcations. These robustness tests are identical to those of Table 3, except in Column 5,
where we have added the lagged productivity change rather than the contemporaneous change as
a control.
Panel A again underscores the bias of OLS regressions. Although the coeﬃcients for the eﬀect
of imports on productivity have the right sign in seven out of eight cases, the magnitude of the
coeﬃcients is around 0.4%, or only one-sixth of the true eﬀect.
Wages and Input Costs
While productivity explains a large part of the price-dampening eﬀect of import competition,
costs might also be aﬀected by trade. In Table 5, we examine the eﬀect of imports on wages and
on the cost of input goods. We present the OLS estimations in Panel C, the instrumental variable
estimations in Panel B, and the ﬁrst-stage estimations in Panel A.
In Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the hourly wage
of production workers in each sector. Column (1) presents the baseline estimation, Column (2)
controls for U.S. productivity growth, and Column (3) controls for lagged changes of worker wages.
While the OLS regressions in Panel C suggest that competition from LICs tends to decrease the
hourly wages of production workers, this is not supported by the IV estimations.
Rather, the coeﬃcient of changes of the import share is estimated to be positive, although
not statistically signiﬁcant. A potential explanation for the positive correlation is that produc-
tivity increases considerably when import competition increases, therefore beneﬁting production
workers. This result, however, does not imply that low-skilled workers do not suﬀer from import
competition: the absence of any industry-speciﬁce ﬀect could also be the consequence of workers
being mobile across industries. As a result, diﬀerences between sectors are non-responsive to
import competition.
While sector-speciﬁcw a g e ss e e mn o tt ob ea ﬀected, low-cost imports might nevertheless aﬀect
the cost of production since they reduce the costs of inputs. In Column (4), we analyze the eﬀect
of imports on the change in the cost of materials purchased. The dependent variable is the change
in the logarithm of the cost of material divided by the value of shipments. Interestingly, although
far from signiﬁcant, the ratio of the costs of inputs does drop considerably (see Panel B) when
imports from low-cost producers increase.
18To further investigate the importance of input goods, we directly analyze whether the response
of prices to imports is diﬀerent in sectors that contain more or less intermediate goods, inputs,
and parts. We construct a measure of input intensity following Schott (2004) and split the sample
into sectors that do and do not contain inputs.
Column (5) only includes six-digit NAICS sectors which do not include 10-digit HS goods code
containing the words "Parts," "Input," or related abbreviations in the sector description. The
ﬁrst stage is well identiﬁed, and the eﬀect of imports on prices is estimated at -2.339, comparable
to our baseline estimate.
In the estimations of Columns (6) to (8), the sample is restricted to the six-digit NAICS sectors
that include at least one 10-digit HS sector with "Parts," "Input," or related abbreviations in the
sector description and a non-zero trade ﬂow. In the OLS regressions of Panel C, the response of
prices in the sector with inputs and without (Column (5) and (6)) have similar coeﬃcients, and
the impact of imports is comparable to or greater for sectors that do not have imports.
However, when we turn to the instrumental variable estimations, a diﬀerent issue arises. Our
instrumentation strategy cannot explain trade ﬂows in the sample containing input goods. Also,
when we add additional instruments, the ﬁrst and second lag of manufacturing growth in LICs
interacted with labor intensity, in Column (7), or instrument for the change of net imports in
Column (8), the ﬁrst-stage estimation is not signiﬁcant. Consequently, the second-stage estimation
is weakly identiﬁed.
In sum, our instrumentation strategy does not predict the intermediate good content of trade
and therefore does not capture the "cost channel" eﬀect of inputs from China and similar countries,
but rather the pro-competitive eﬀect of low-wage country imports.
U.S. Markups
The ﬁrst four columns of Table 6 present the relationship between changes in U.S. imports
from nine LICs and changes in markups and proﬁts of domestic U.S. ﬁrms. Panel C displays
the OLS results and Panel B the two-stage least squares estimations. Markups are deﬁned as
one minus the ratio of variable costs divided by the value of shipments. Column (1) displays the
basic regression for markups, Column (2) adds productivity growth in the U.S. as a control and
Column (3) adds the lagged change in markups as a control. Column (4) presents the baseline
19regression for proﬁts deﬁned as one minus total costs over the value of shipments.
The OLS regressions in Panel C suggest that import competition is associated with increasing
markups and proﬁts. The sign of the instrumental variable coeﬃcients are of the opposite sign,
although they are again not signiﬁcant.
However, it is noteworthy that the sign of the coeﬃcients are within the right order of magni-
tude. Consider the baseline estimation including only year dummies and ﬁxed eﬀects. In the basic
estimation of Column 5 of Table 2, a 1% increase in import competition is associated with a 3.1
percentage point drop in prices. This is nearly fully explained by a 2.4% increase in productivity
and a 0.35% decrease in markups (see Column (1) of Tables 4 and 6).
7 Demand Elasticity and the Eﬀect of LIC Trade
The results presented so far highlight the importance of the productivity reshuﬄing channel of
Melitz (2003) as the main channel through which low-wage country imports aﬀect U.S. industry.
We next document that the response of trade volume, prices, and productivity to growth in
low-wage countries varies across the dimension of the elasticity of substitution in a way highly
consistent with the Melitz model.
We document that while the response of import volume to output growth in LICs is much
more pronounced in sectors with elastic demand, the response of prices and productivity to a
given increase in import volume is much larger in sectors with inelastic demand. While these
diﬀerential responses are present in the short run, they are even more pronounced in the long run.
In Columns (5) to (8) of Table 6, we split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution.
The elasticities we use are estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) following the methodology of
Feenstra (1994). There are two striking ﬁndings. First, the response of import volume to growth
in LICs is much stronger in sectors with elastic demand (see Panel A). This ﬁnding is intuitive
given that we estimate the instantaneous response of import volume to growth in LIC output
capacity. Foreign ﬁrms ﬁnd it easier to penetrate markets with elastic demand.10
10Chaney (forthcoming) shows that sectors with inelastic demand oﬀer higher proﬁts and, therefore, the additional
set of ﬁrms that start exporting is larger when the elasticity is low. This long run "distorted-gravity" eﬀect is absent
in our data.
20Second, for a given change in import volume, the response of prices and productivity is larger
in sectors with inelastic demand (see Panel B). Also this result is intuitive: a given level of import
competition implies a much larger change in proﬁts when the elasticity of substitution is low.
Consequently, a much larger crowding out eﬀect of unproductive ﬁrms occurs.11
We next analyze the time dimension of how imports, prices, and productivity react to growth
in LICs and we again evaluate whether this reaction is diﬀerent for sectors with diﬀerent demand
elasticities. We are interested in how imports react in the long run to the growth in LICs and we
are interested in how prices react in the long run to imports.
First, in Column (1) to (5) of Table 7, we check whether imports react to lagged growth in
LICs. We begin by adding the lagged manufacturing growth times the average labor share of the
sector in Column (1), and we successively also add the second and third lags in Columns (2) and
(3). Then in the next two columns, we keep the three lags, but we again split the sample by the
median elasticity of demand, which equals 5.55. We ﬁnd that overall, most of the response of
imports to growth in LIC’s is instantaneous and that also the major diﬀerence in how high and
low elasticity sectors are aﬀected by growth is instantaneous.
There is also evidence that imports react with a lag and that this is more pronounced in
s e c t o r sw i t he l a s t i cd e m a n d . T h es i n g l ec o e ﬃcients for the lags of LIC growth interacted with
labor intensity are not signiﬁcant. However, the joint test that the sum of the lagged coeﬃcient
equals zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. In addition, a test that the long-run response of
imports diﬀers for sectors with elastic and inelastic demand cannot be rejected at the 5% level.
Second, in Columns (6) to (10) of Table 7, we investigate the long-run response of prices to
growth in LICs. There are three ways in which prices might be aﬀected dynamically. Prices might
react in a staggered way to changes in imports. Moreover, Column (1) to (5) document that the
response of trade ﬂows to growth in LICs is somewhat staggered, itself. Last, prices might be
autoregressive. We therefore present reduced-form estimations that directly relate our (lagged)










ﬁrm i’s proﬁts in equilibrium are equal to a share of 1/  of revenue minus the ﬁxed costs of operating the business.
When all domestic ﬁrms in the industry loose 1% of their revenue to foreign competitors, ceteris paribus, the
absolute loss in proﬁts is the largest in low-elasticity industries. Since the exit rate of unproductive ﬁrms depends
on proﬁtability, the response of industry to a 1% increase in foreign competition is more pronounced if the elasticity
of demand is low.
21instrument to price changes and we also control for lagged price changes.
In Column (6), we add the ﬁrst lag of our instrument and the lagged price change. We add
the second and third lag in Columns (7) and (8). The estimations reveal that prices display non-
trivial mean reversion. While there is no eﬀect of the ﬁrst and second lag of LIC growth on U.S.
prices, there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the third lag of the growth in LICs. In Columns (3) to (5),
we documented that the price response is not the result of imports reacting with a lag to growth.
Consequently, the staggered response of prices to our instrument must be the consequence of
prices reacting with a lag to import competition.
We next split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution in Columns (9) and (10),
with two interesting ﬁndings. First, the instantaneous response of prices to growth in LICs is
about the same in sectors with high and low elasticity of substitution. Second, the response is
markedly diﬀerent after three years.
In the reduced-form estimation, prices react strongly to lagged manufacturing growth in in-
elastic sectors. This cannot be explained by the response of imports to lagged growth (see Column
(4) and (5)), so it must be the long term response of prices to a given level of import competition
that diﬀers between sectors with diﬀerent demand structures.
This diﬀerential response of prices in the long term can be rationalized in the context of the
existing literature. A given level of import competition leads to much greater losses of proﬁts in a
sector with inelastic demand. Therefore, the long-term exit of unproductive ﬁrms and consequent
productivity growth is much more pronounced in these sectors.12
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates how imports from LICs inﬂuence prices, productivity, and markups in the
United States. The novel contribution is to instrument for trade ﬂows that are endogenous to
U.S. demand with marginal trade ﬂows implied by comparative advantage.
Our instrument relies on the observation that when LICs grow, their exports increase much
12We have no understanding of why the diﬀerential eﬀect occurs exactly after three years rather than smoothly
through time. We have also evaluated longer horizons, but three years is the lag at which the response diverges
across sectors with diﬀerent elasticities.
22more in labor-intensive sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. Thus, we instrument for trade
ﬂows using the interaction between growth of LIC manufacturing output and sectoral labor share.
Second, we develop an empirical framework that abstracts from sector-speciﬁc trends and
aggregate ﬂuctuations. Due to our diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence approach, the identifying restriction
necessary to establish the causal eﬀect of trade only requires that U.S. relative demand shocks are
not systematically biased toward labor-intensive goods. The latter assumption seems reasonable
ex ante and can also be tested by investigating whether imports from developed nations are
systematically biased towards labor-intensive goods, which is not the case.
We then document that trade with LICs had a strong impact on prices and productivity. Our
two-stage least square speciﬁcation predicts that LIC exports are associated with strong downward
pressure on prices and strong productivity growth. For example, when LIC exports capture 1% of
U.S. market share, producer prices decrease by 3%, with about three-fourths of this change due
to productivity growth.
Surprisingly, we do not ﬁnd any evidence of a negative eﬀect of LICs on the wages of unskilled
workers. We also show that our results are not driven by cheap intermediate goods imports. We
therefore argue that the eﬀect of low-wage country imports works via the channel hypothesized
by Melitz (2003).
The empirical ﬁndings based on our instrumentation strategy uncover much stronger eﬀects of
globalization than is commonly assumed and reverse, for example, the "China does not matter"
verdict reached by Kamin et al. (2006).
Regarding the aggregate eﬀect of LIC growth on U.S. industry, our results should be inter-
preted with care. We estimate the eﬀect of imports on relative rather than absolute level. Due
to the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence type identiﬁcation, our methodology abstracts from factors such as
the increase in global raw material prices that growth in LICs has brought about.
Given these limitations, the aggregate eﬀect we estimate is the following. From 1997 to 2006,
LIC import share has risen by around one percentage point per year in the sectors that this study
covers. Hence, we estimate that from 1997 to 2006, the U.S. PPI inﬂation rate in manufacturing
was reduced due to the trade with LICs by more than two percentage points (each year), while
productivity growth was increased by one to two percentage points. China accounts for more
23than half of the total eﬀect.
While manufacturing prices only make up a fraction of PPI inﬂation and producer price
inﬂation is passed through imperfectly to consumers, the aggregate eﬀect of imports from the
newly developing world surely cannot be neglected.
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28Appendix A: Data Sources
Industrial production (For China, there is no reliable estimate of Manufacturing Production)
China: IMF International Financial Statistics
Manufacturing production:
Mexico: IMF International Financial Statistics
The Philippines: IMF International Financial Statistics
India: Datastream Malaysia: Datastream
Brazil: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Indonesia: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Canada: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Germany: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Japan: OECD Main Economic Indicators
Thailand: Bank of Thailand
Vietnam: General Statistics Oﬃce of Vietnam
Deﬁnition for Markups
Markup = (Value Added - Total Compensation Paid to Employers)/ Value of Shipments
where
Value Added = Value of Shipments - Cost of Materials, Fuels, Electricity
thus
Markup = (Value of Shipments - Variable Costs )/ Value of Shipments
where
Variable Costs = Cost of Materials, Supplies, Fuels, Electricity + Total Compensation Paid to
Employers
Skill intensity = (number of employees - average number of production workers)/number of em-
ployees
Source: Annual Survey of Manufacturers
Value Added is compiled by the BLS and also adjusts for changes in inventories, and the income
29from merchandise operations.
Data Sources for Figures 1 to 4
Figure 1: United States International Trade Commission
Figure 2: Trade data are from the United States International Trade Commission. Labor share is
from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturers and is deﬁned as total compensation of employees
divided by total compensation of employees and total capital expenditures.
Figure 3: Real capital stock is from B. Bosworth used in Bosworth and Collins (2007). Eﬀective
labor supply: total number of persons employed in China (Asian Development Bank) times real
manufacturing wage growth in China (nominal wage growth from Laborstat database ILO and
GDP deﬂator from the World Bank Development Indicators).
30Appendix B: List of Outliers
35 NAICS-Year observations where excluded because the absolute year-to-year price change ex-
ceeded 0.25 log points.
Year Naics  Sector Names
2003 311212 Rice Milling
1999
2002
1998 312221 Cigarette Manufacturing.
1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005 324110 Petroleum Refineries
Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing
Plastics Pipe and Pipe Fitting Manufacturing
2004 331111 Iron and Steel Mills
2003, 2004, 2005  331411 Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper.
2006 331419 Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous Metal 
2005, 2006 331421 Copper Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding
2005 331422 Copper Wire (except Mechanical) Drawing
2006 331491 Nonferrous Metal Rolling, Drawing
(except Copper Aluminum)
2006 331492 Secondary Smelting, Refining, and Alloying 
of Nonferrous Metal  (except Copper Aluminum)
2004 332311 Prefabricated Metal Building and 
Component Manufacturing
2000 334414 Electronic Capacitor Manufacturing.
325311 2000, 2001, 2003 
Table A - Observations with Absolute Change of Ln Price > 0.25 
2004 331222 Steel Wire Drawing
2004 331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product Manufacturing
2005 326122
2000 327420 Gypsum Product Manufacturing
2004 325211 Plastics Material and Resin Manufacturing
2004 325192 Cyclic Crude and Intermediate Manufacturing
2006 325193 Ethyl Alcohol Manufacturing
2004 325181 Alkalies and Chlorine Manufacturing
2005 325182 Carbon Black Manufacturing
2003 321219 Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing
2004 325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing
2003 321212 Softwood Veneer and Plywood Manufacturing
311512 Creamery Butter Manufacturing
1998, 2003, 2004 311613 Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing
31(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
US Imports originating from China China China Mexico India Vietnam Canada Japan Japan China
Panel Estimation with  RE, w/o year  FE, w/o year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year
 dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies
Sample
Dependent Variable
Labor Share  -0.051
[0.016]**
Growth Industrial Production -0.445 -0.447
 in China [0.093]** [0.093]**
Growth Ind. Prod. China * 0.665 0.668 0.667
Labor Share  [0.108]** [0.108]** [0.107]**
Growth Manufact. Mexico * 0.121
Labor Share  [0.044]**
Growth Manufact. Mexico * 0.062
Labor Share  [0.022]**
Growth Manufact. Vietnam * 0.052
Labor Share  [0.014]**
Growth Manufact. Canada * 0.021
Labor Share  [0.053]
Growth Manufact. Japan * 0.078
Labor Share  [0.052]
Growth Manufact. Japan * 0.210
Skill Intensity [0.036]**
Growth Ind. Prod. China * 0.049
Skill Intensity [0.076]
F i x e d  E f f e c t s   nyyyyyyyyy
Y e a r  D u m m i e s nnyyyyyyyy
O b s e r v a t i o n s  2 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 02 8 9 0
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
R-Squared  (within) 0.082 0.087 0.106 0.031 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.046 0.057 0.092
Dependent variable is the y/y absolute change of (Country Imports / (US Industry Size+World Imports)) 
 325 6-Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (NAICS 3111111 to 3399999) 
Table 1 - Growth of Manufacturing Output, Factor Intensity, and Imports (Panel Estimations)
Notes: Table 1 presents the relation between the growth of manufacturing output in several nations, factor intensity and growth of U.S. imports. The countries covered are China 
(Columns (1), (2), (3), and (10)), Mexico in Columns  (4), India in Column  (5), Vietnam in Column  (6), Canada in Column (7), and Japan in Columns (8) and (9) The dependent 
variable is the year to year in the level of Import from the respective country divided by the U.S. industry size. U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. 
shipments plus total imports in the respective industry.  An industry is measured at the six-digit NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). All specifications except (1) and (2) 
include year dummies, and all specifications except (1) include fixed effects (FE) by industry; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
32(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
w/o year Incl. LIC  with Year Incl. LIC  with Year
dummies Manfct. Growth Dummies Manfct. Growth Dummies
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Sample: 
Ch. Imports LIC 0.232 0.048 -0.009 -3.112 -3.097
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.047]** [0.047] [0.047] [0.733]** [0.710]**
Ch. % LIC Manfacturing 0.508 1.269
Output [0.038]** [0.187]**
Within R-Square 0.01 0.08 0.11
Labor Share * Ch. % LIC   1.07 1.073
Manfct. Output [0.200]** [0.197]**
Ch. % LIC Manfacturing -0.675
Output [0.172]**
Year dummies (both stages) n n y n y
Observations 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325
R-Square (first stage within) - - - 0.10 0.12
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (Imports LIC / U.S. industry Size)
Table 2 - LIC Imports and U.S. Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Six-Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Panel B: OLS or 2nd Stage - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change U.S. Producer Price
Notes: Panel B of Table 2 displays the relation between changes of imports from nine LICs and U.S. Producer Prices. The dependent 
variable is the annual change in the logarithm of U.S. producer price at the six-digit NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. 
Imports LIC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LIC Imports/US Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 
average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. In Columns (2) and (4), "Ch. % LIC Manfct." is the weighted growth rate of 
manufacturing output in the nine LICs. In the lower Panel A the first-stage relation is displayed and the instrument is the sectoral labor 
intensity times Ch. % LIC Manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
33( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )
Lagged Lagged Ch. Adding Lagged Adding Including Changes in Chinese
LIC imports LIC Imports PPI Changes Productivity  Outliers NET Imports Imports
Ch. Imports LIC 0.006 0.036 0.034 -0.030 0.131
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.047] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050] [0.064]*
Ch. NET Imports LIC -0.092
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.042]*
Ch. Imports China -0.108
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.061]
Instrumented Ch. Imports LIC -3.276 -2.234 -2.249 -3.463 -5.788
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.832]** [0.653]** [0.633]** [0.842]** [1.269]**
Instrumented Ch. NET Imports  -2.818
LIC (in % of US Industry Size)  [0.643]**
Instrumented Ch. Imports -3.516
China (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.701]**
Lag 1 of Imports LIC 0.061
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.052]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports 0.122
 LIC (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.083]
Lag 1 of Sectoral Inflation (PPI) -0.019
[0.025]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.037
[0.025]
Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC NET Imp. LIC Imports China
Labor Share * Ch.% LIC  0.962 1.059 1.104 1.03 1.007 1.18
Manfacturing Output [0.199]** [0.213]** [0.216]** [0.212]** [0.190]** [0.222]**
Labor Share * Ch. %  Chinese 0.755
Manfacturing Output [0.116]**
Lag 1 of Imports LIC 0.035
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.010]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports LIC 0.066
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.021]**
Lag 1 of Sectoral Inflation (PPI) 0.003
[0.008]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.015
[0.005]**
Observations 2667 2381 2345 2279 2702 2667 2667
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
R-Square (first stage within) 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.11
Table 3 - LIC Imports and U.S. Prices (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies) 
Sample: 6 Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Change of 
Not Displayed: Estimations Include Controls of Panel B
Panel B: IV Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Ln-change of the 6 Digit NAICS US Producer Price
Panel C: OLS estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Ln-change of the 6 Digit NAICS US Producer Price
Notes: All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies. Panels B and C of Table 3 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LICs and 
U.S. producer prices. Panel C displays the OLS results and Panel B the two-stage least-squares estimations. The dependent variable is the annual change in the logarithm of 
U.S. producer prices at the six-digit NAICS level (manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports LIC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LIC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). 
U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Imports LIC" in (1) is normalized by the U.S. industry size. Panel A 
presents the first-stage estimation. "Ch. % LIC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LICs. The instrument 
employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LIC (or Chinese in (7)) manufacturing output. "Productivity" in (4) is the four-, five-, or six-digit NAICS productivity growth 
from the BLS; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
34(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic  Lagged Lagged Ch. Adding Lagged Adding Including Changes in Chinese
Specification LIC imports LIC Imports PPI Changes Productivity  Outliers NET Imports Imports
Ch. Imports LIC 0.323 0.329 0.424 0.412 0.331 0.362
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.101]** [0.101]** [0.116]** [0.118]** [0.101]** [0.099]**
Ch. NET Imports LIC -0.012
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.089]
Ch. Imports China 0.236
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.129]
Lag 1 of Imports LIC -0.034
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.060]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports  LIC -0.13
 (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.117]
Lag 1 of Sectoral -0.109
 Inflation (PPI) [0.041]**
Lag 1 U.S. Productivity -0.140
 Growth [0.022]**
Instrumented Ch. Imports  2.375 2.759 2.043 1.743 2.180 2.051
LIC (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [1.022]* [1.201]* [1.122] [1.052] [0.960]* [1.003]*
Instrumented Ch. NET Impt. 2.243
 LIC (in % of US Industry Size)  [1.012]*
Instrumented Ch. Imports 0.407
China (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.986]
Lag 1 of Imports LIC -0.183
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.100]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports  LIC -0.243
 (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.147]
Lag 1 of Sectoral -0.107
 Inflation (PPI) [0.043]*
Lag 1 U.S. Productivity -0.140
Growth [0.024]**
Observations 2317 2317 2031 1957 2279 2350 2317 2317
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
Table 4 - LIC Imports and U.S. Productivity (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Sample: 6 Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Panel B: IV Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y US Productivity Growth (BLS)
Panel C: OLS estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y US Productivity Growth (BLS)
Notes: Table 4 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LICs and the four, five, or six digit NAICS annual productivity growth from the BLS. 
Panel B displays the OLS estimation results and Panel A the two-stage least squares results. "Ch. Imports LIC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LIC 
Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Imports LIC," "Imports China," 
and "Net imports LIC" are normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LIC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the 
nine LICs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LIC (or Chinese in (8)) manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and 
year dummies. For First Stage see Panel A of Table 3 (except Column (5)); * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
35(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cost of  Parts=1
Basic Productivty Lagged Wage Inputs Basic 3 Instruments Net Imports
Hourly Wage Hourly Wage Hourly Wage Inputs/ Revenue  Producer Price Producer Price Producer Price Producer Price
Ch. Imports LIC -0.141 -0.148 -0.167 -0.039 -0.032 0.017 0.017
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.079] [0.079] [0.092] [0.121] [0.081] [0.039] [0.039]
Ch. NET Imports LIC -0.003
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.033]
Ch. Imports LIC 1.754 1.711 1.896 -2.141 -2.339
(in % of US Industry Size)  [1.365] [1.442] [1.434] [2.133] [0.561]**
Ch. NET Imports LIC
(in % of U.S. Industry Size) 
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.008
[0.027]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Wage -0.319
[0.034]**
Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC NET Imp. LIC
Labor Share * Ch.% LIC  0.601 0.568 0.627 0.585 1.479 -0.510 -0.803 0.252
Manfacturing Output [0.227]** [0.227]* [0.237]** [0.304] [0.218]** [0.501] [0.604] [0.582]
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch.%  1.096
 LIC Manfacturing Output [0.557]*
Lagf 2 Labor Share * Ch.% 0.093
 LIC Manfacturing Output [0.525]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.011
[0.006]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Wage -0.007
[0.009]
Observations 1843 1843 1521 1142 1116 1116 999 1116
Sectors 325 325 325 289 138 138 138 138
R-Square (first stage)  0.08 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.04
Table 5 - LIC Imports, Wages, and Input Costs (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel B: IV Estimates 
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Change of:
Parts =0 Production Worker Wage
(6) to (8) weakly identified
Sample: Six Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Not Displayed: Estimations Include Controls of Panel B
Dependent Variable (Panel B and C) is the Ln Change of:
Panel C: OLS estimates
Notes: Panels B and C of Table 5 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LICs and changes in production worker wages, cost of inputs, or 
producer prices. Panel C displays the OLS results and Panel B the two-stage least-squares estimations. Worker wage is defined as total wage payments to production 
workers divided by the total amount of hours worked. Input Costs is defined as the ratio of the cost of inputs over turnover (domestic shipments). Columns (5) to (8) 
examine the role of intermediate inputs. Column (5) only includes sectors which do not include any 10-digit HS goods code containing the words "Parts," "Input," or 
related acronyms and a non-zero trade flow. Columns (6) to (8) contain only these sectors. The second-stage estimation in (6) to (8) is not displayed since the 
estimation is weakly identified. "Ch. Imports LIC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LIC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-
2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Net imports LIC" is normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LIC Manufacturing Output" is the 
weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LICs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LIC manufacturing output. All 
estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
36(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Profits
Basic Productivty  Lag. Markup per Revenue Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55
1+ Markup 1+ Markup 1+ Markup Profits
Ch. Imports LIC 0.161 0.141 0.193 0.864 0.052 0.025 0.452 0.278
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.046]** [0.045]** [0.055]** [0.342]* [0.092] [0.055] [0.192]* [0.125]*
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.084
[0.010]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.250
[0.029]**
Ch. Imports LIC -0.339 -0.842 -0.622 -5.426 -8.65 -1.516 5.692 1.493
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.704] [0.807] [0.777] [5.503] [3.843]* [0.504]** [3.346] [1.008]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.096
[0.015]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.254
[0.031]**
Labor Share * Ch.% LIC  0.601 0.568 0.634 1.018 0.490 1.61 0.488 1.490
Manfacturing Output [0.227]** [0.227]* [0.237]** [0.184]** [0.204]* [0.335]** [0.205]* [0.364]**
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.011
[0.006]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.004
[0.015]
Observations 1843 1843 1521 2890 1333 1334 1159 1158
Sectors 325 325 325 325 162 163 162 163
R-Square (first stage) 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.15
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (Imports LIC / U.S. industry Size)
Markup
Sample: 6 Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Dependent Variable (Panel B and C) is the Ln Change of:
Panel C: OLS estimates
Producer Price Productivity
Table 6 - LIC Imports, Markups, and Elasticity of Demand (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel B: IV Estimates 
Dep. Var is  Ch. Ln. Price Dep. Var is  Ch. Ln. Productivity
Notes: Columns (1) to (4) of Table 6 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LICs and changes in markups, profits, prices and productivity. 
Panel C displays the OLS results and Panel B the two-stage least-squares estimations. Markups are defined as one minus the ratio variable costs over the value of 
shipments and profits are defined as one minus total costs over the value of shipments. Columns (5) to (8) split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution 
(5.55). The elasticity of each six-digit NAICS sector is the unweighted average of the underlying HS 10 elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006). "Ch. Imports 
LIC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LIC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus 
world imports. Also "Net imports LIC" is normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LIC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of 
manufacturing output in the nine LICs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LIC manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects 
by sector and year dummies; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
37(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag1 Lags  1-2 Lags  1-3 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55
Labor Share * Ch.  -2.452 -2.525 -2.489 -2.671 -2.297
% LIC Manfct. Output   [0.504]** [0.495]** [0.544]** [0.805]** [0.734]**
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch. -0.124 0.389 -0.192 0.477 -0.858
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.472] [0.511] [0.572] [0.844] [0.779]
Lag 2 Labor Share * Ch. -0.363 -0.102 -0.295 0.111
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.470] [0.527] [0.787] [0.706]
Lag 3 Labor Share * Ch. -1.768 -3.027 -0.742
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.661]** [0.995]** [0.890]
Lag 1 Ch. PPI Price -0.026 -0.058 -0.088 -0.08 -0.095
[0.018] [0.019]** [0.022]** [0.032]* [0.030]**
Lag 2 Ch. PPI Price -0.112 -0.139 -0.109 -0.157
[0.019]** [0.022]** [0.033]** [0.029]**
Lag 3 Ch. PPI Price -0.03 -0.041 -0.033
[0.023] [0.035] [0.032]
Labor Share * Ch.  1.006 1.091 1.100 0.671 1.487
% LIC Manfct. Output   [0.184]** [0.206]** [0.226]** [0.259]** [0.363]**
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch. 0.287 0.262 0.167 -0.227 0.537
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.177] [0.189] [0.235] [0.266] [0.383]
Lag 2 Labor Share * Ch. 0.351 0.411 0.161 0.612
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.176]* [0.200]* [0.232] [0.320]
Lag 3 Labor Share * Ch. -0.053 -0.326 0.207
% LIC Manfct. Output [0.238] [0.274] [0.382]
Y e a r  d u m m i e s   yyyyyyyyyy
Observations 2890 2568 2245 1129 1116 2345 2021 1700 851 849
Sectors 325 325 325 163 162 325 325 289 146 143
R - S q u a r e  ( w i t h i n ) 0 . 1 2 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 4 0 . 1 7 0 . 1 4 -----
Only first Stage Regressions
Sample: 6 Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Table 7 - The Long Run Response of U.S. Prices (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel A:  Dependent Variable is the y/y change of Imports LIC / US industry Size
Panel B: Reduced Form Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Change of Ln Price PPI
(6) - (8) all sectors
Reduced From Equations
Notes: Table 7 displays the long-run effect of LIC trade on U.S prices and productivity. Panel B presents the results relating imports or growth in LCIs to U.S. prices and Panel A 
presents the first-stage estimation relating LIC output growth to LIC imports. In Panel A, Columns (1) to (5), the estimation adds lagged values of the interaction of LIC growth 
and labor intensity directly to prices. Columns (5) to (10) display reduced-form estimations that relate the (lagged) interaction of LIC growth and labor intensity directly to prices.  
Columns (4), (5), (9), and (10) split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution (5.55). Elasticities are from Broda and Weinstein (2006). "Ch. Imports LIC" is defined as 
the y/y absolute change in (LIC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Net 
imports LIC" is normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LIC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LICs. The 
instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LIC manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
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